Analysis of factors affecting Qatar's productive gas behavior to compare with optimum production strategy of the south Pars_North Dome gas field(Econometrics_game theory Approach)

Document Type : RESEARCH PAPER

Authors

1 Ph.D Candidate, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran.

2 Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran

3 Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran

Abstract

The analysis of the factors affecting Qatar's gas productive behavior is of particular importance due to its joint membership with Iran in the Gas Exporting Countries Forum and the gas field of South Pars-North Dome. In this research, initially, the Qatar's gas productive behavior against Iran's gas production from the gas field of South Pars and other variables affecting the supply and demand of global gas (the gas production of other members of this Forum, global gas demand, natural gas price, the global price of crude oil and shale gas production) was investigated using seasonal data from 2001 to 2021 and auto-regressive method with distributed lags (in the long term). Then, using the Game Theory and Nush Equilibrium, the optimal production strategy was extracted from the gas field of South Pars - North Dome (in the period under review) in order to compare with the Qatar's gas productive behavior against Iran's production from the South Pars gas field. The results showed that when there is a change (increase/decrease) in the mentioned variables, the Qatar's gas productive behavior does not always change in line with these variables; also, in the long term, with a one percent increase in Iran's gas production from the South Pars, Qatar's gas production has increased by more than one percent. Finally, the results showed that the optimal production strategy for Qatar from the gas field of South Pars-North Dome in the period under review has been an increase in production, which is in line with the behavior of this country against Iran's gas production from the gas field of South Pars in the long term.

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Stable Economy Journal
Volume 5, Issue 3 - Serial Number 15
September 2024
Pages 137-170

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