اثر ارتباطات سیاسی بر توانایی تأمین مالی شرکت‌ها – شواهدی از تحلیل رگرسیون کوانتایل

نوع مقاله : پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استاد گروه اقتصاد دانشکده اقتصاد مدیریت و علوم اداری دانشگاه سمنان، سمنان، ایران

2 دانشکده اقتصاد، مدیریت و علوم اداری دانشگاه سمنان

3 دانشیار اقتصاد، دانشکده اقتصاد دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران

چکیده

پژوهش حاضر تأثیر ارتباطات سیاسی بر ساختار سرمایه شرکت‌های بورسی تهران را با تأکید بر ناهمگنی این اثر در سطوح مختلف اهرم مالی بررسی می‌کند. داده‌های تابلویی متعادل شامل ۱۶۰۰ مشاهده سال-شرکت در دوره ۱۳۷۶ تا ۱۴۰۰ با روش رگرسیون کوانتایل پنلی تحلیل شد تا تفاوت‌های توزیعی پنهان در مدل‌های میانگین‌محور شناسایی شود. ارتباطات سیاسی با نسبت بدهی بلندمدت به کل بدهی‌ها پروکسی گردید که در فضای نهادی ایران نشان‌دهنده دسترسی ترجیحی به تسهیلات بانکی دولتی و شبه‌دولتی است. یافته‌ها حاکی از اثر مثبت و معنادار ارتباطات سیاسی بر اهرم مالی است، اما شدت این اثر ناهمگن است: در کوانتایل‌های پایین (شرکت‌های کم‌اهرم با محدودیت شدید تأمین مالی) تأثیر به‌طور چشمگیری قوی‌تر و در کوانتایل‌های بالا (شرکت‌های پراهرم با دسترسی پایدار به اعتبار) به‌طور قابل‌ملاحظه‌ای ضعیف‌تر است. این نتایج نشان می‌دهد ارتباطات سیاسی در اقتصادهای نوظهور به‌عنوان جایگزین غیررسمی برای ضعف نهادهای مالی عمل می‌کند و به‌ویژه برای شرکت‌های مواجه با کمبود منابع خارجی، تأمین مالی بدهی را آسان‌تر می‌سازد. از منظر سیاست‌گذاری، مطالعه بر لزوم افزایش شفافیت مالی، کاهش نقش روابط سیاسی در تخصیص اعتبار و تقویت چارچوب‌های نهادی تأکید دارد تا مزایای نابرابر ناشی از ارتباطات سیاسی کاهش یابد و توسعه متوازن بازار سرمایه ایران تسریع گردد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

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